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LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE NLRB V. BILDISCO:
PARTIAL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS
SURROUNDING LABOR CONTRACT REJECTION
IN BANKRUPTCY
DAVID

L.

GREGORY*

INTRODUCTION

This article will analyze the critically important Bankruptcy Amendments of 19841 which partially overruled the Supreme Court's controversial decision in NLRB v. Bildisco.2 The decision was issued on
February 22, 1984 and the legislation was enacted July 10, 1984.
Among the most significant elements of the Bildisco opinion were the
Court's affirmation of the power of the debtor-in-possession 3 in bankruptcy proceedings 4 to unilaterally abrogate a collective bargaining
*

Associate Professor of Law, St.John's University Law School; LL.M., Yale Univer-

sity Law School; J.D., University of Detroit, M.B.A., Wayne State University; B.A., Catholic
University of America.
1. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333-392 (codified in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.).
2. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); see generally Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy:
The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REv. 539 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Gregory, The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor].
3. "Debtor-in-possession" normally refers to an employer who has filed for reorganization pursuant to the Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1)
(1982). Although there are some technical distinctions, the debtor-in-possession generally
has the powers of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
Section 1104 provides for appointment of a trustee, but this provision is not ordinarily invoked.
The norm, under section 1104, is to leave the debtor in possession unless a party
in interest requests appointment of a trustee or examiner. Upon such request,
after notice and hearing the court shall appoint a trustee if one of two conditions
is found to exist: (1) fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement,
or (2) a trustee would be in the best interest of creditors, and equity security
holders, and other interests, regardless of number of holders of securities or the
amount of assets or liabilities.
Herzog & King, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (pamphlet ed. 1983), 463 (comments on § 1104).
Unless otherwise noted, this article will use the terms debtor-in-possession, trustee, and
employer interchangeably.
4. Labor contract rejection is normally sought in Chapter 11 reorganizations, rather
than in Chapter 7 liquidations. In the latter, the business will not resurface. Therefore, it
is largely academic whether the labor contract is rejected. Congress has expressly emphasized this distinction between the nature and purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization and
Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's [sic] finances so that it may continue to operate, provide
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for
production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than
those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return on assets that a business can
produce is inadequate to compensate those who have invested in the business.
Cash flow problems may develop, and require creditors of the business, both
trade creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If the
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agreement without first engaging in good faith bargaining with the
union 5 and without committing an unfair labor practice under sections
8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)
when rejection occurs prior to bankruptcy court approval. 6 After four
months of intensive congressional lobbying by organized labor, these
crucial elements of Bildisco were legislatively overruled in the broader
context of the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984. 7 After closely analyzing this legislation, the pertinent cases decided subsequent to Bildisco
will also be briefly reviewed, since the new statutes have only prospective application. Finally, some of the most important policy implications
of both Bildisco and the new legislation will be discussed.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN NLRB

v.

BILDISCO

Affirming the decision of the Third Circuit,8 the Court unanimously
held that collective bargaining agreements could be abrogated by the
debtor-in-possession without prior bargaining with the union. 9 The
business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a viable state.
It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5963, 6179. For further discussion of the distinctions between reorganization
and liquidation, see, Note, Collective BargainingAgreements and the Bankruptcy Reform Act: What
Test Should the Bankruptcy Court Use in Deciding Whether to Allow a Debtor to Reject a Collective
BargainingAgreement?, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 862, 868 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, What
Test Should the Bankruptcy Court Use]; Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 392 (1981).
5. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
6. Id. at 1201; 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(d).
7. The 1984 legislation was the product of a much broader two year struggle by
Congress to rectify the unconstitutionality of the bankruptcy courts, since the Supreme
Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Const. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982). In Marathon, the Court held that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code violated article III of
the Constitution. The judicial power of the United States must be vested only in courts
whose judges enjoy Article III life tenure and protection against salary diminution during
their term of office. As the Court ruled in Marathon:
Article III bars Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy laws. The
establishment of such courts does not fall within any of the historically recognized
situations in which the general principle of independent adjudication commanded by Art. III does not apply.
Id. at 76. This article will not discuss the broad constitutional considerations surrounding
the bankruptcy courts. For further commentary regarding the broader constitutional contours of the Marathon decision, see articles cited in Gregory, The Supreme Courts Attack on
Labor, 25 B.C.L. Rev. 539, 548 n.48 (1984).
8. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982). For earlier commentary on the Third
Circuit's decision, see Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1983); Pulliam, The Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANK. L.J. 1 (1984);
Note, What Test Should The Bankruptcy Court Use?, supra note 4.
9. 104 S. Ct. at 1197, 1200. The Court expressly relieved the debtor-in-possession
from any prior duty to bargain to impasse, and explicitly stated that complex labor determinations were beyond the province of the bankruptcy court's expertise.
Whether impasse has been reached generally is a judgment call for the Board to
make; imposing such a requirement as a condition precedent to rejection of the
labor contract will simply divert the Bankruptcy Court from its customary area of
expertise into a field in which it presumably has little or none.
Id. at 1200.
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Court did, however, recommend that the employer undergoing reorganization and the union representatives first engage in reasonable efforts
to negotiate contract concessions and modifications.' 0 Before intervening, the bankruptcy court must be satisfied that these negotiations "are
not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.""I Since prior
good faith bargaining was not mandated, there was no requirement that
the parties bargain to impasse before the debtor-in-possession unilaterally abrogate the labor contract. Over a vitriolic dissent to the third part
of an otherwise unanimous decision, 12 a bare majority further held that
the debtor-in-possession would not commit an unfair labor practice' 3 by
"unilaterally rejecting or modifying a collective bargaining agreement
before [obtaining authorization for] formal rejection by the Bankruptcy
Court.'

14

After unilateral rejection by the debtor-in-possession, the bankruptcy court would determine whether rejection was appropriate by assessing the equities. 15 Deferring to the special nature of the collective
bargaining agreement,' 6 the Court deemed that the standard for labor
contract rejection should be "stricter than the traditional 'business judgment' standard applied by the courts to authorize rejection of the ordinary executory contract."' 7 The Court rejected the stricter test for
labor contract rejection adopted by the Second Circuit, which required
the debtor-in-possession to show that liquidation would occur absent
contract rejection.' 8 After assessing the legislative intent behind section
10. Id. at 1196.
11. Id.
12. Justice Brennan filed a dissent to Part III of the opinion, joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun.
13. Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982),
states, in part:
(a) it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
14. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
15. Id.
16. The Court stated: "because of the special nature of a collective bargaining contract, and the consequent 'law of the shop' which it creates, a somewhat stricter standard
should govern." (citations omitted) Id. at 1195.
17. Id.
18. The Second Circuit's stricter test for whether labor contract rejection was warranted is illustrated in Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). REA Express substantially tightened the standards
enunciated one month earlier by the Second Circuit in Shopman's Local Union 455 v.
Kevin Steel Prod., inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1975). Essentially, the REA Express test was
that labor contract rejection "should be authorized only where it clearly appears to be the
lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is rejected, the carrier [employer] will
collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs." 523 F.2d at 172.
Rejecting the REA Express strict test as the "illegitimate progeny" of Kevin Steel, the
Third Circuit in Bildisco explained:
We reject this more stringent test for two discrete but related reasons: first, for
the pr-agniatic reason that it may be impossible to predict the success vel non of a

reorguanization until very late in the arrangement proceedings; and second, for
the prudential consideration of whether the employees will continue to have jobs
litIll. . ..

We also reject the more stringent test because it could work to the detriment of
the workers it seeks to protect. By erecting an excessive evidentiary barrier to
rejection of labor contracts, the REA Express - Alan Wood Steel formulation would
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365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code' 9 the Court concluded that the Second
Circuit's stricter test for labor contract rejection was inimical to the fundamental policies of bankruptcy law and to the practical likelihood of
successful business reorganization. 20 The Court adopted the less strict
Third Circuit test as the appropriate standard to determine whether labor contract rejection was warranted. 2 ' The standard required bankruptcy courts to determine whether the labor contract burdened the
estate and whether the concerned parties as a whole would ultimately
22
benefit from the rejection.
The Court vested a private employer with the unilateral power to
rewrite its labor contract governing the hours, wages, and terms and
conditions of employment. This unilateral action was subject only to an
after-the-fact review by the bankruptcy court based on a supposed careful scrutiny of all the equities. Because the Court had already relieved
the employer of its duty to comply with any of the bargaining requirements, the union was deprived of any viable role. If the bankruptcy
court determined the prior unilateral rejection was not warranted, it
could vitiate the prior rejection. However, the likelihood of such court
action would be remote. The bankruptcy courts have traditionally manifested indifference and often hostility to the interests of labor. The
bankruptcy courts view their primary responsibility as the revitalization
of imperiled enterprises. Labor interests, perceived as potentially contrary to business interests, are often viewed with disfavor by the
courts.

23

make it likely that numerous businesses attempting to reorganize will in fact be
forced over the line into liquidation. Adherence to a collective bargaining agreement together with a successful reorganization is surely the best of possible
worlds; but given the inevitable potential for conflict between these goals we
think it preferable that jobs be preserved through rejection of a labor contract
than that they be lost because of its acceptance.
682 F.2d at 80.
19. 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
20. Id. "The standard which we think Congress intended is a higher one than that of
the 'business judgment' rule, but a lesser one than that embodied in the REA Express
opinion."
21. The Third Circuit summarized the test as follows:
We believe that the debtor-in-possession must first demonstrate that the continuation of the collective bargaining agreement would be burdensome to the estate;
that once this threshold determination has been made the debtor-in-possession
must make a factual presentation sufficient to permit the bankruptcy court to
weigh the competing equities; that the polestar is to do equity between claims
which arise under the labor contract and other claims against the debtor; that, in
this, the court must consider the rights of covered employees as supported by the
national labor policy as well as the possible 'sacrifices which other creditors are
making' in the effort to bring about a successful reorganization and that the court
must make a reasoned determination that the rejection of the labor contract will
assist the debtor-in-possession or the trustees to achieve a satisfactory reorganization. (citation omitted)
In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 81. Between the Third Circuit's decision and the affirmance by
the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the Bildisco test in In re Brada Miller
Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983). Brada Miller is fully consonant with
the Third Circuit test in Bildisco.
22. Id. 104 S. Ct. 1196-97.
23. For further discussion of the pro-business institutional bias of the bankruptcy
courts, see Gregory, The Supreme Court's Attack On Labor, supra note 4.
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The Bildisco decision would have furthered this predicament. The
Court's endorsement of a "careful scrutiny" formula was compromised
because the Court failed to provide any coherent structure to guide this
allegedly "careful" review. The employer was relieved of its duties to
bargain in good faith with the union and to secure court approval before
rejecting the labor contract. The Bildisco opinion merely enumerated
the general equities for bankruptcy courts to consider in determining
whether the prior unilateral contract rejection was warranted. 24 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court was accorded wide discretion in assessing these equities and was strongly influenced by its overriding objective
of expediting successful business reorganization. 25 Absent egregious
bad faith by the employer, the court's pro-business bias virtually guaranteed that the interests of labor would be subordinated to those of the
debtor-in-possession and the creditors. The courts' decisions favored
the philosophy that a job at reduced wages was better than the alternative of loss of employment. By preventing unemployment, troublesome
employee and labor equities would be deemed sufficiently considered,
26
The
and the primary task of business reorganization could proceed.
loose equities test administered by bankruptcy courts subsequent to
contract rejection was devastating to employee and labor interests.
If the Bildisco decision had not been partially remedied by legislation, it would have had an irreparable impact on effective collective bargaining and on realistic prospects for achieving coherent labor law
jurisprudence. The article will now examine the key statutory provisions
of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments which corrected the Bildisco
decision.
II.

LEGISLATIVE RECTIFICATION OF BILDISCo

The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
added section 1113 to the comprehensive Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and
substantially remedied Bildisco.2 7 These new provisions afford some
meaningful protections for unionized employees and establish workable
guidelines and chronologies for labor contract rejection, but the primary goal of the Bankruptcy Code, to successfully reorganize business,
is still preserved at the heart of the Code. Hopefully, the effect of section 1113 will be that when collective bargaining agreement rejection is
24. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
25. [T]he Bankruptcy Court must focus on the ultimate goal of Chapter II when
considering these equities. The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize free-wheeling consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities
relate to the success of the reorganization. The Bankruptcy court's inquiry is of
necessity speculative and it must have great latitude to consider any type of evidence relevant to this issue.
Id. at 1197.
26. For examples of courts applying this analysis, see Bordewieck & Countryman, The
Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 293
(1983).
27. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 1113, 98 Stat. 390-91 (1984) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113).
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authorized by the bankruptcy court, all parties will better understand
why rejection was approved and why alternatives to rejection were not
viable.
Under section 1113, after filing a petition for reorganization and
prior to filing an application for rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement, the trustee 2 8 must comply with several provisions. The
trustee must propose modifications to the union of contractual terms
and conditions of employment which "are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and [assure] that all creditors, the debtor and
all of affected parties are treated fairly and equitably." '29 Further, the
trustee must provide the union with "such relevant information as is
necessary to evaluate the proposal." ' 30 Until the bankruptcy court conducts a hearing on the contract modification proposal, "the trustee shall
meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative [of the
union] to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement."''
This prior good faith bargaining requirement imposed on the debtor-in-possession thus overrules
one of the two most devastating aspects of Bildisco. The second major
element of Bildisco was likewise vitiated by requiring formal court approval prior to labor contract rejection. 3 2 The bankruptcy court is no
longer accorded broad discretion in assessing the general equities of
each case. In addition to insuring that "the balance of the equities
clearly favors rejection," 33 the bankruptcy court must be satisfied that
the debtor-in-possession first complied with the good faith bargaining
requirements prior to the hearing 34 and the union "refused to accept
such proposal without good cause."'3 5 Unlike Bildisco, the new prior bargaining requirement makes subsequent judicial assessment of all the equities structured and meaningful.
While creating substantial safeguards for the contractual rights of
unionized employees, the new legislation failed to incorporate the
strong labor protections proposed in H.R. 5174,36 passed by the House
of Representatives on March 22, 1984. The original House bill would
have also provided express judicial consideration not only for the "successful . . . reorganization of the debtor" but also for "preservation of

the jobs covered by such agreement." ' 37 Under the House bill, the bankruptcy court could have approved rejection of the labor contract only if
the parties had engaged in prior unsuccessful good faith bargaining and
28.

The amendments refer to "trustee" to include debtor-in-possession; see supra note

29.

11 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(l)(A); see supra note 27.

3.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(l)(B). However, protective orders are also available to prevent union disclosure of the debtor's information to industry competitors. 1I U.S.C.
§ 1113(d)(3); see supra note 27.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2); see supra note 27.
32. 11 U.S.C. § l113(c); see supra note 27.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(3); see supra note 27.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(1); see supra note 27.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(2); see supra note 27.
36. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H1806 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984).
37. Id.
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"absent rejection of such agreement, the jobs covered by such agreement will be lost and any financial reorganization of the debtor will
fail. 1 3 8 Unfortunately, the final legislation fails to recognize these interests and to provide express protections for preserving jobs. Instead,
concern for jobs is subsumed into the balance of the equities 39 the court
will consider.
The new legislation also permits the court, after notice and hearing,
to authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or workrules provided by the collective bargaining agreement "if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business,
or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate.''40 This provision
is designed to afford interim relief, but does not affect the application
41
for rejection nor the final hearing on the application.
The hearing on the rejection application is also expedited. All interested parties must be notified at least ten days prior to the hearing
and may testify at the hearing.4 2 Normally, the hearing will be held
within fourteen days after the trustee files the application for rejection of
the collective bargaining agreement. 4 3 The court will normally issue its
decision on the rejection application within thirty days of the commencement of the hearing. 44 If the decision is not rendered within the
time limits, "the trustee may terminate or alter any provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling of the court on such
application." ' 4 5 Although the power of the debtor-in-possession to impose interim modifications with court approval 4 6 and to terminate or
alter the contract if a court decision is not timely rendered 4 7 is potentially significant, no unilateral alteration or termination of a labor contract can be effected without compliance with the new statutory
48
provisions.
III.

POST-BILDISCO CASE LAw

Since the bankruptcy amendment is prospectively effective and does

not apply to litigation commenced prior to its enactment, no significant
case law has yet developed under the new legislation. 49 However, the
38. Id.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(3); see supra note 27.
40. 11 U.S.C. § I I13(e); see supra note 27. In its original form, H.R. 5174 contained

no analagous provision.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(f); see supra note 27.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1); see supra note 27.
43. Id.
44. 1I U.S.C. § 11 13(d)(2); see supra note 27. In its original form, H.R. 5174 provided
for completion of the hearing within fourteen days of its commencement, but contained no
time limit provision for rendering a decision.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(d)(2); see supra note 27. In its original form, H.R. 5174 contained no analagous provision.
46. 1I U.S.C. § 1113(e); see supra note 27.
47. I1 U.S.C. § I I 13(d)(2); see supra note 27.
48. I1 U.S.C. § 1113(f); see supra note 27.
49. Virtually all of the post-Bildisco case law involves judicial scrutiny of the facts of
each case to insure the labor contract rejection process comports with either the judicial,
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new statutory provisions do substantially overrule much of the Bildisco
decision. A brief survey of the post-Bildisco pre-statutory case law will
emphasize the drastic ramifications of the Bildisco decision and highlight
improvements resulting from subsequent legislation.
It quickly became obvious from the few pertinent post-Bildisco decisions, that Bildisco did not serve as carte blanche for employer prerogatives. Contract rejection was not allowed if the solvent employer acted
in bad faith by engaging in only a pretext of reorganization to break the
union. 50 Although Bildisco did not expressly mention the parties' motives, one bankruptcy court found them to be a "proper factor to be
considered when balancing the equities."'" Because the record was replete with direct evidence of the employer's overt anti-union animus as
the motive for seeking labor contract rejection, the motion to reject the
52
contract was denied.
Termination of operations will not necessarily permit contract rejection. 5 3 When business operations have ceased, the business interests
of successful reorganization are no longer the court's paramount concern and labor interests become an equal concern. It would be more
advantageous for the employer to maintain operations to benefit from
the statutory and judicial concern for effecting viable reorganization. Financial savings resulting from cessation of operations will not automatically make labor contract rejection appropriate.
Cessation of business operations is distinguishable from the normal
expiration of the labor contract. In the latter situation, the contract's
54
effective term has lapsed and it is no longer an executory contract.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held an employer's petition to reject mooted by the contract's expiration. 55 The employer unsuccessfully argued that the court should have applied the relation-back
the contract executory and permit its rejection dedoctrine to render 56
spite its expiration.
or now statutory, provisions and insures careful assessment of all the equities. The postBildisco decisions show significantly heightened judicial sensitivity to union and employee
interests. See In re Pesce Baking Co. Inc., 43 Bankr. 949 (Bankr., N.D. Ohio 1984); In re
Schuld Mfg. Co. Inc., 43 Bankr. 535 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1984); Wally Elec. Supply Co.,
270 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,563 (1984); Earle Equip. Co., 270
N.L.R.B. No. 121, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,375 (1984).
50. In re C & W Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496, (Bankr., N.D. Ohio 1984).
51. Id. at 502.
52. Neither C. & W. nor William Catlett have been honest with the Union. Catlett threatened the Union, missed scheduled meetings, and delayed in giving requested financial information. For the most part, Catlett's testimony before this
court was self-serving and less than credible. His surprising candor in admitting
his anti-union bias upon cross examination only serves to underscore his bad
faith.
Id. at 503-4.
53. In re Total Transp. Serv. Inc., 37 Bankr. 904 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
54. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 450-62
(1973).
55. Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. ILGWU, 730 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 1022. The Fourth Circuit distinguished Gloria Mfg. from Bildisco. "Bildisco is
not applicable to this case because the collective bargaining agreement . . .had expired
and was therefore no longer executory." Id. at 1021 n.1. Since the expired contract was
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Other than these examples of bad faith and business liquidation,
Bildisco was designed to promote expeditious labor contract rejection to
effect the ultimate objective of successful business reorganization. This
purpose remained the central policy focus of the subsequent legislation.
Approval of labor contract rejection is equally likely under Bildisco or
under the new section 1113 when the employer is not solvent, despite
57
union concessions, employer good faith and austerity measures.
IV.

PROGNOSIS-CAuTIOUS

OPTIMISM

An unremedied Bildisco decision could have wreaked havoc on labor
relations. Of course, solvent corporations did not rush en masse into
the rigors of reorganization merely to abrogate their labor contracts.
The strictures of reorganization are unpalatable enough, and even
Bildisco would not have condoned bad faith pretextual manipulation of
the bankruptcy law by solvent employers solely to destroy the union.
Large solvent multinational corporations would be least likely to use
Bildisco for such an illegitimate purpose. For the most part, these corporations have mature, established labor relations histories with large unions. The real dangers posed by Bildisco were at the smaller end of the
corporate spectrum, which is still the bedrock of American enterprise.
Smaller marginal businesses operating in unstable, highly competitive
markets 58 without the resources or the inclination to retain informed
labor counsel were more likely to enter into reorganization proceedings
seeking labor contract rejection. This could have resulted in the hasty
abrogation of a collective bargaining agreement which, upon reflection,
the employer may have wished to preserve with some modifications. After reorganization, the union is likely to remain as the employee's exclusive bargaining representative. Even if labor contract rejection is
approved, the reorganized employer will still have to bargain with the
union. The first item on the agenda will usually be the negotiation of a
new collective bargaining agreement. The prior bargaining requirement may prevent potential hostility in negotiations otherwise likely to
have been engendered by spontaneous unilateral labor contract abrogation. Without prior bargaining, labor misunderstanding and hostility
could have thoroughly poisoned post-reorganization labor relations.
Recent labor relations developments have repeatedly demonstrated
the wisdom of pursuing good faith concession bargaining. For the most
part, unions have responsibly demonstrated willingness to make often
significant contract concessions to assist truly financially imperiled
not executory, the rejection of the contract could not relate back to the day preceding the
filing of the employer's petition to reject the contract.
57. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 Bankr. 343, (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
58. Bildisco & Bildisco, a general partnership, can be characterized in this way. When
Bildisco filed for bankruptcy, eighteen of its employees, representing 40-45% of its work
force, were covered by the labor contract in question. 104 S. Ct. at 102. By the date of the
rejection hearing, only three employees remained who were covered by the agreement.
682 F.2d at 75.
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employers. 59
The new legislation is not failsafe. It remains doubtful whether
bankruptcy courts possess sufficient labor law expertise to determine
whether the prior bargaining was good faith but ultimately unsuccessful
hard bargaining or whether it was bad faith, proforma surface bargaining.
Even for the labor law expert, determining the nature of bargaining is
often a frustrating task of evaluating action according to intangible standards. Bankruptcy courts have previously demonstrated only sporadic
appreciation of labor law considerations. Leaving these bargaining determinations to the bankruptcy courts alone may prove unwise. The
better course would be to vest the bankruptcy courts and the National
Labor Relations Board with joint supervision of these cases, leaving all
labor law determinations, such as those regarding the nature of the prior
bargaining, to the expertise of the NLRB.
Requiring prior court approval to reject the labor contract should
prior bargaining be unsuccessful was the other major correction of
Bildisco effected via the new legislation. The judicial hearing under an
expedited time frame, with a decision normally rendered within thirty
days of the commencement of the hearing, will be palatable to all parties. If the court is unable to render a timely decision, the employer may
effect interim unilateral modifications. While this power is potentially
ominous, it is only an interim relief measure. Any unilateral contract
changes implemented without union consent are subject to later vitiation by the court if deemed unwarranted. While no significant case law
has yet developed, this scenario may be rendered academic. It is contingent upon the bankruptcy courts issuing decisions in a timely fashion, as
provided by the statute. Judicial administrative diligence should preclude employers from resorting to contingent, interim relief through
unilateral contract termination which the statute was designed to prevent. If the courts are not punctilious, this unilateral interim relief provision could become a troublesome, unwise loophole in an otherwise
sound statute.
59. For recent examples of significant union concessions, see, Lone Star Steelworkers
Wage Concession Contract, 114 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 41 (Sept. 19, 1983) (members of the
United Steelworkers Union accept "one of the steepest pay cuts negotiated in the current
round of contract concessions - an across-the-board reduction of $2.80 per hour"); Concessions for Meatpackers, 113 LAB. REL. REP. 188 (BNA) (July 4, 1983) (members of United
Food and Commerical Workers vote to accept concessions significantly reducing wages
and benefits after employer filed for bankruptcy); ContractApprovals in Airline Indusy, 112
LAB. REL. REP. 202 (BNA) (Mar. 14, 1983) (concessions agreed to by transport workers
union include elimination of paid meal periods, "increased deductibles under a comprehensive medical insurance plan and slower procession schedules to top rates for new
hires"); Wage, Benefit Cuts For Steel Employees 112 LAB. REL. REP. 22 (BNA) (Jan. 10, 1983)
(Steelworkers approve new contract cutting wages, benefits, vacations and holidays); Williams, Wilson Food Fights Back, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1983, at L31, Col.2 (The corporation
originally sought wage reductions from $10.69 to $6.50 an hour, in its bankruptcy petitions filed in April, 1983 which precipitated strikes by 5,000 employees at seven plants.
However, the last of the striking unions has agreed to a wage reduction to $8 per hour,
plus similar reductions in fringe benefits); Serrin, How DeregulationAllowed Greyhound to Win
Concessions From Strikers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1983, at A22, col.2 ; Holusha, Unions May Wait
to Make Up for Lost Time, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983, at E5, col.2 .
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CONCLUSION

The new legislation provides significant rectification of the radical
Bildisco decision. While labor interests remain subordinated to those of
ownership in the new legislation, they are now an express part of the
general equation. By requiring concession bargaining and court approval prior to rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, both employers and bankruptcy courts are forced to recognize labor interests. If
history is a reliable guide, 60 most concession bargaining will be successful and no judicial intervention will be required. If prior bargaining is
unsuccessful, the statute provides safeguards for labor through an expedited participatory hearing. Unfortunately, the judicial balancing of all
the equities to determine whether labor contract rejection is warranted
remains a largely unstructured exercise, with serious potential abuse by
bankruptcy courts reflecting pro-enterprise institutional bias. By avoiding overt displays of anti-union tactics and prejudices, the clever employer may still severely handicap the union while simultaneously
effecting business reorganization.
This analysis assumes a "worst possible case" scenario of ulterior
employer objectives. In most instances, financially imperiled employers
will responsibly seek reorganization without anti-union animus. Business has every right to pursue this legitimate avenue in highly competitive world markets. Abuses of the bankruptcy laws, whether pre-or postBildisco, are relatively rare and the new legislation makes it less likely that
abuses will succeed.
The legislation prevented a return to the often overtly hostile labor
relations climate that existed prior to the passage of the National Labor
Relations Act in 1935. In addition to increased strike activity and labor
violence, an unremedied Bildisco decision would have compelled a labor
strategy of agreeing only to one year collective bargaining agreements.
Three year labor contracts could have been suicidal, except with the
most solvent large corporations. Labor would have had every tactical,
preventive reason to avoid longer contracts that could have been summarily and unilaterally abrogated by employers unexpectedly entering
into reorganization. In addition to increasing employer labor relations
costs, one year contracts would have seriously destabilized and debilitated labor-management relations.
In the short term, the remedial legislation saved federal labor policy
from possible disintegration. However, the prospects for achieving full
labor management equilibrium are still not assured because labor cannot match the power of multinational corporations. While a great deal
of work remains, the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 represent a
small, incremental step toward achieving a responsible labor law jurisprudence. Perhaps Congress will yet reconsider the merits of compre61
hensive labor law reform.
60. See examples cited supra note 59.
61. Prospects for comprehensive labor law reform legislation in the foreseeable future
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are remote. The Democratic Senate was unable to pass reform legislation during the
Carter presidency despite the strong support of the administration and organized labor. It
is unlikely that any meaningful reform legislation will be entertained during the Reagan
administration with a Republican Senate. Nevertheless, proposals for future labor law legislative reforms have been resurrected and forcefully advanced in recent prominent studies. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN &JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984); WILLIAM
B. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAw (1984).

